Supreme Court of Texas Holds Attorney General May Seek to File Quo Warranto Action Against Annunciation House

The decision

On May 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed a judgment of the 205th Judicial District Court in El Paso County that had refused the Attorney General leave to file a quo warranto action against Annunciation House, Inc., an El Paso nonprofit that operates shelters, and had enjoined him from making further requests to examine its records. The court held that the Attorney General has constitutional authority to file the proposed action, that the trial court applied the wrong standard in denying leave, and that the records-request statutes are not facially unconstitutional. The injunction was vacated and the case remanded.

The opinion, by Justice Evan A. Young, describes the holding as narrow: “Our primary holding is that the attorney general has the constitutional authority to file his proposed quo warranto action, which simply allows the usual litigation process to unfold.” It adds: “It is too early for us, or for any court, to express a view about the merits of the underlying issues.”

Background

According to the opinion, Annunciation House, founded in 1976, has long worked with the Roman Catholic Diocese of El Paso and provides food and housing to its guests regardless of immigration status. On February 7, 2024, three state officials arrived at one of its shelters with a written “Request to Examine” records under the Business Organizations Code, stated that production must be immediate, and stated that noncompliance would result in forfeiture of the right to do business in Texas and a criminal penalty. Annunciation House’s attorney said it would respond within thirty days; the Attorney General demanded compliance the next day.

Annunciation House sued in district court for a temporary restraining order and a declaratory judgment. The Attorney General filed a plea to the jurisdiction, an answer, and a motion for leave to file a counterclaim in the nature of quo warranto seeking revocation of the corporation’s charter. His amended filings accused Annunciation House of “systematic conduct that constitutes illegal alien harboring and operation of a stash house.”

Annunciation House moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted it, holding Business Organizations Code §§ 12.151–.152 facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourth Amendments and that the request constituted religious harassment under Government Code § 2400.002, and it enjoined further records requests unless first filed with that court for precompliance review. The trial court also denied leave to file the quo warranto counterclaim and denied the Attorney General’s requested injunction, holding among other things that Business Organizations Code § 11.301(a)(5) abrogates quo warranto in this area, that the allegations did not constitute harboring under Penal Code §§ 20.05(a)(2) and 20.07(a)(1) as construed in Cruz v. Abbott, that those provisions are preempted and unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that the counterclaim would violate the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Attorney General took a direct appeal under Government Code § 22.001(c).

The court’s reasoning

Quo warranto authority

After reviewing the history of quo warranto in English and Texas law, the court framed the issue: “the question reduces to whether the attorney general may file a lawsuit.”

The court rejected Annunciation House’s argument that Article IV, § 22 reaches only unlawful taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage, reading the text to treat “exercising” unauthorized power separately from “demanding” or “collecting” taxes. Citing decisions of other state supreme courts, the court held “that criminal acts are not categorically excluded as predicates for the invocation of the attorney general’s authority to file a quo warranto action,” while leaving open whether any particular criminal act qualifies. Relying on State v. Teachers Annuity Life Insurance Co., the court also concluded that determining whether “sufficient cause” exists lies within the Attorney General’s discretion unless the legislature has expressly withdrawn a kind of action.

Because Article IV, § 22 permits limits only when “expressly directed by law,” the court treated the provision as a constitutional clear-statement rule: “the statute it invokes must be inescapably clear.” Section 11.301, which never mentions quo warranto, did not meet that standard. Chapter 66 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes rather than limits quo warranto, and its “power not granted by law” language mirrors the constitutional text.

The leave-to-file standard

The court approved the standard applied by the courts of appeals: the trial court accepts the State’s allegations as true and asks whether the petition states a cause of action. “A motion for leave is therefore not an opportunity to litigate the entire case before it is even filed.” The court said the standard is “not a mere rubber stamp”; leave may be denied where the filing alleges no conduct Texas law proscribes.

The court agreed with Annunciation House that merely providing shelter is not harboring, endorsing the Fifth Circuit’s reading in Cruz that harboring “requires some level of covertness well beyond merely renting or providing a place to live.” But it read the Attorney General’s pleadings to allege that Annunciation House purposefully and systematically shields illegal aliens from detection and refuses to allow law enforcement to enter, which, taken as true, satisfied § 66.002(d)’s “probable ground” requirement.

RFRA, preemption and vagueness

Assuming without deciding that RFRA operates in quo warranto proceedings, the court held that “in the present posture of the case, RFRA is an improper basis for the district court to have denied the attorney general leave merely to file the quo warranto counterclaim.” The relevant government action at this stage is the filing, not a charter revocation that may or may not follow; the court stated it foreclosed none of the RFRA arguments on remand.

On preemption, the court found no identified preempted field, relying on Kansas v. Garcia, and found the case controlled by Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting because the Texas statute tracks federal law and covers only knowing conduct. On vagueness, the court held the fair-notice objection was resolved by Cruz’s construction and that pursuing “violations of clearly defined criminal laws” through quo warranto is an ordinary exercise of discretion.

The records requests

The court held the records-request dispute was not moot, agreeing with Annunciation House that the Attorney General’s ceasing to press the request was voluntary abandonment. On the merits, it read City of Los Angeles v. Patel as requiring an opportunity for precompliance review, not as forbidding administrative records requests. It construed “immediately” in § 12.152 to mandate maximum expedition rather than instantaneous compliance, against the background of protective orders under Rule of Civil Procedure 176.6(e). That reading, the court wrote, “does not permit him to withhold precompliance review altogether.” The statutes were therefore not facially unconstitutional.

The court also found no evidence in the record that the Attorney General acted based on Annunciation House’s religious association under § 2400.002, applying the presumption of good faith recognized in Von Dohlen v. City of San Antonio; Annunciation House did not defend that ruling on appeal.

Separate opinions

None. Justice Sullivan did not participate.

Status

The opinion states: “The judgment of the district court is reversed, the injunction it granted is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” The court also reversed and remanded the denial of the Attorney General’s requested injunction, stating that whether he may receive injunctive relief against Annunciation House’s operations “is not before us.” Should the Attorney General renew that request, the trial court must assess it in light of the court’s holdings. The court added: “We express no view as to the course or outcome of those further proceedings.” The opinion does not decide whether Annunciation House engaged in harboring or whether its charter should be revoked.

The decision was widely reported.