Court of Criminal Appeals Holds Convicting Court Lacked Jurisdiction Over Death-Row Inmate’s Constitutional Habeas Challenge to Execution Drugs

The decision

On September 24, 2025, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, in a per curiam opinion, held that the 5th Judicial District Court of Bowie County lacked jurisdiction over a habeas corpus application filed by William Keith Speer, who is under a sentence of death. The application had asked the district court to enjoin the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) from using allegedly expired and fire-damaged pentobarbital in Speer’s then-scheduled execution. The court concluded that, while an execution date was set, such an injunction would function as a stay of execution, and that only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction to grant one. It returned the case to the convicting court “with instructions to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction.”

The court did not decide whether Speer’s method-of-execution claims have merit, and it did not decide whether such claims can support habeas relief at all. It held that when such a claim is raised by a constitutional writ in the face of an active death warrant, the writ must be filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Background

According to the opinion, Speer was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in October 2001. In July 2023, the convicting court set his execution for October 26, 2023.

On October 4, 2023, Speer filed in the convicting court an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article I, Section 12 of the Texas Constitution and Article 11.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He alleged that in August 2023 a fire had damaged the third floor of the Administration Building at TDCJ’s Huntsville Unit, where TDCJ stores the pentobarbital it uses in executions, and that the fire and fire-suppression efforts exposed the supply to hours of high temperatures, smoke and water. He also alleged that the supply had already expired before the fire. He claimed that executing him with “expired and fire damaged pentobarbital” would violate the Eighth Amendment, Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution, and Article 43.24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that TDCJ’s procurement, handling and planned use of the drug violated the Texas Pharmacy Act, the Texas Controlled Substances Act, the Texas Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Texas Penal Code, in violation of due process, the Eighth Amendment and equal protection. He asked the court to temporarily enjoin TDCJ’s use of the drugs in his execution, to permit discovery and factual development, and to hold an evidentiary hearing.

The convicting court denied relief on the merits on October 12, finding that Speer “only provided speculation with respect to his claims.”

On October 17, Speer sought leave to file an original habeas application in the Court of Criminal Appeals raising many of the same claims; the court denied leave without written order on October 25. Separately, he filed a second subsequent Article 11.071 application on October 18, and on October 26, the scheduled execution date, the court stayed the execution pending further order.

On November 10, Speer filed a notice of appeal from the October 12 order directed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth District. The Court of Criminal Appeals docketed the case on December 1, 2023.

The court’s reasoning

Jurisdiction after finality

The court began by stating that it would examine the convicting court’s jurisdiction before addressing anything else. It stated that a district court does not enjoy “general” jurisdiction after a conviction becomes final; quoting In re Texas Department of Criminal Justice, any post-finality jurisdiction “must be conferred by the Texas Constitution or by statute,” and the conferring provision defines its scope.

Because Speer’s application invoked only habeas jurisdiction under Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution and Article 11.05, the court framed the question as whether a district court sitting as a habeas court has subject matter jurisdiction over method-of-execution claims.

Exclusive jurisdiction over stays of execution

The court acknowledged that Article V, Section 8 “grants Texas district courts plenary power to grant writs of habeas corpus,” quoting Ex parte Hargett, and that together with Article 11.05 it sometimes permits relief on “constitutional writs” outside the statutory habeas procedures, citing Ex parte Valdez. But it stated that some remedies district courts cannot give even under that power.

The court relied on State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals for the Third District, a 1994 decision (noted as disavowed on other grounds by Ex parte Elizondo) in which it granted mandamus against a court of appeals that had enjoined an execution. It described Holmes as resting on jurisdiction, not merely authority. The court then reviewed Article 43.141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows a convicting court to reset an execution date when notice was not timely given, or to modify or withdraw the order setting the date when further proceedings are needed on an Article 11.071 application or a Chapter 64 DNA motion. It characterized those situations as “narrow and exclusive.” Outside them, the court stated, state courts “have no jurisdiction to stay or enjoin a scheduled execution, reset an execution date, withdraw an order setting an execution date, or recall a death warrant.”

The injunction as the functional equivalent of a stay

The court acknowledged that its 2023 decision in In re State ex rel. Paxton, as an unpublished opinion, “has no precedential value and is not authoritative,” but stated that “we remain persuaded by the rationale upon which Paxton was based.” It wrote: “In the face of an active death warrant and imminent execution, an injunction preventing TDCJ from using a certain category of drugs when carrying out the warrant would function as a stay of execution.” Such an injunction, the court held, would encroach on its exclusive jurisdiction over stays, so the convicting court “lacked jurisdiction even to entertain the specific form of relief that Applicant requested in his constitutional writ.”

The court stated that, under Holmes, method-of-execution claims raised in the face of an active death warrant may not be raised by a constitutional writ filed in the convicting court and, when raised on habeas, must be filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals, which alone can afford relief on such claims “should they state a valid basis for habeas corpus relief.”

Valdez and earlier unpublished appeals

The court noted that Speer had argued to the convicting court that Valdez required him to file there first, but argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that “it is appropriate for this Court to resolve these grave issues directly.” It explained that Valdez said the convicting court is ordinarily the place to first seek relief “if it has habeas jurisdiction.” The court reasoned that because district courts lack jurisdiction outside Article 43.141 to stay or enjoin an execution, the convicting court is not the appropriate court for such a constitutional writ. “Our decision today is therefore in harmony with Valdez.”

Suspension of the writ

Finally, the court stated that its reasoning “does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus or deprive Texas district courts of any jurisdiction they would otherwise lawfully enjoy.” Recalling Ex parte Renier’s suggestion that denying an applicant any forum would effectively suspend the writ, the court wrote: “But we do not hold today that Applicant has no forum in which to litigate a ripe method-of-execution claim. We hold only that, should he choose to do so via a constitutional writ, he must do so in this Court by invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction.” It cited Article V, Section 5, Briggs, and Judge Cochran’s concurrence in Ex parte Alba.

Separate opinions

Judge Yeary filed a concurring opinion. He wrote: “I agree with the Court’s opinion in this matter—with one caveat.” He continued: “I do not understand the Court’s stated limitation on the availability of habeas corpus relief under the circumstances necessarily to preclude Appellant from seeking some other form of extraordinary relief, such as by seeking an application for a writ of prohibition.” He added that whether such non-habeas process is available in this case “is not before us today,” and joined the court’s opinion with that understanding.

Status

The court returned the case to the convicting court with instructions to dismiss the constitutional habeas application for lack of jurisdiction. The opinion states that Speer’s second subsequent Article 11.071 application remains pending in the Court of Criminal Appeals, which stayed his execution on October 26, 2023, pending further order, and that he does not have a scheduled execution date. The decision was included in the Texas District & County Attorneys Association’s weekly case summaries.