Court of Criminal Appeals Grants Actual-Innocence Relief to Carmen Mejia in Travis County Felony-Murder Case

The decision

On January 22, 2026, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted post-conviction habeas relief to Carmen Mejia, who had been convicted in Travis County of felony murder, injury to a child, and injury to a child by omission. In a three-page per curiam opinion, the court stated: “We agree that Applicant has established that she is actually innocent. Relief is granted.” The court set aside the judgments and remanded Mejia to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis County to answer the charges in the indictment.

The per curiam opinion cites Ex parte Elizondo and Ex parte Tuley for the grant of relief but contains no discussion of the evidence or the legal standard. It does not state which judges joined it, and it is marked “Do not publish.” Judge Finley, joined by Judge Parker, filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, marked for publication, that agrees Mejia is entitled to relief but would grant it on a different ground.

Background

The per curiam opinion states that Mejia was sentenced to life imprisonment on each of the three counts, to run concurrently, and that the Third Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in 2008. The remaining history is drawn from Judge Finley’s separate opinion.

According to the separate opinion, the charges arose from the 2003 death of A.C., a ten-month-old child whose father paid Mejia to care for him while the father worked. A.C. sustained third-degree burns over seventy percent of his body and died of organ failure. At trial, the State argued that Mejia intentionally held the child in scalding bathwater and then waited about three hours before seeking hospital care. A pediatric physician who treated A.C. testified that the burns were more consistent with the child having been held in scalding water and that the sparing of his back was “obviously consistent with someone doing it on purpose.” A retired police officer who consulted on the case, Phylip Peltier, testified that the child was likely held down by an adult. The Travis County chief medical examiner testified, based on an autopsy performed by a colleague, Dr. Elizabeth Peacock, that the death was a homicide.

Mejia called her children, none of whom implicated her. She testified that one of her daughters, about three years old at the time and referred to in the separate opinion as A.P., had put A.C. in the tub, and that she had lied to investigators because she feared her children would be taken from her. The jury convicted her on all counts.

Mejia’s first habeas application, filed in 2014, alleged withheld evidence, a coercive interrogation, and ineffective assistance of counsel; it did not raise a claim of actual innocence. The court denied it without written order on October 8, 2014. She filed the present application in September 2025, raising four claims: false testimony, new scientific evidence under Article 11.073 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, actual innocence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The State agreed that she was entitled to relief on all four grounds, and the habeas court recommended relief on all of them, including a finding that she had established actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

The habeas evidence included a 2024 affidavit from A.P., now an adult, stating: “I don’t know how the baby got in the bathtub. I do remember turning on the water. Almost right after I turned on the hot water, the baby started screaming.” She stated that Mejia was not in the bathroom. Dr. Peacock, who performed the autopsy, stated in an affidavit: “it is my opinion that the manner of death was improperly classified as a homicide, and it is now my opinion that the manner of death should be classified as an accident.” The treating physician and Peltier, both State witnesses at trial, submitted affidavits stating that the injuries could have been caused accidentally by the children. A physician retained to review the medical evidence, Dr. James Gallagher, found no clear evidence that the child was held down, though he also stated that “[t]here is no way to determine with certainty based on the appearance of [A.C.’s] burn injuries whether his injuries were the result of a deliberate or accidental immersion burn in the bathtub.”

The court’s reasoning

What the per curiam opinion states

The per curiam opinion does not analyze the evidence or explain how the Elizondo standard is met. It recites the four grounds raised and observes: “The parties all agree that Applicant is entitled to relief based on these four grounds.” It notes that the trial court determined that Mejia established actual innocence on all three counts by clear and convincing evidence. It then states its agreement, cites Elizondo and Tuley, and orders: “The judgments in cause number 9044057 in the 167th District Court of Travis County are set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment.”

What the per curiam opinion does not address

The opinion grants relief only on the actual-innocence ground. It does not state whether relief is granted or denied on the false-testimony, Article 11.073, or ineffective-assistance claims. It does not address whether any of the claims is barred as a subsequent application under Article 11.07, Section 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is the first of the separate opinion’s stated reasons for disagreement. It does not respond to the separate opinion’s objection to the “actually innocent” label, and it does not report a vote.

Separate opinions

Judge Finley, joined by Judge Parker, concurred in setting aside the convictions and remanding Mejia to the sheriff’s custody but dissented from the ground of decision. He wrote: “Consequently, Applicant is entitled to habeas relief, just not in the way the Court grants it.” The separate opinion gives three reasons for disagreeing with the actual-innocence ruling.

First, Judge Finley concluded that the Elizondo claim is barred as subsequent under Article 11.07, Section 4. In his view, the factual basis for the claim—A.P.’s account that she caused the burns while Mejia was elsewhere—was presented to the jury through the children’s testimony, testimony from Child Protective Services witnesses, and defense counsel’s arguments that the death was an accident, and was also known when Mejia filed her first application. He concluded: “Based on the record before us, as well as the applicable law, the factual basis for Applicant’s actual innocence claim was available at the time of Applicant’s trial and at the time of Applicant’s initial habeas application.” He added that the revised expert opinions are not newly discovered because each rests on A.P.’s 2024 affidavit. He also wrote that the false-evidence and ineffective-assistance claims are barred for the same reasons.

Second, Judge Finley concluded that even on the merits the claim would fail. He wrote that the same accident defense was tried to the jury: “The jury rejected this defense and convicted Applicant on all counts. It is difficult to imagine that a different result would be reached today should Applicant present the same defense again at trial.” He also stressed that the new expert opinions describe an accidental cause as possible rather than established: “First, the medical experts themselves do not foreclose intentional conduct as the cause of A.C.’s injuries.”

Third, he wrote: “Third, this Court should not be in the business of declaring successful Elizondo habeas applicants ‘actually innocent.’” Citing concurring opinions by Judge Yeary, including in Ex parte Cacy, he stated that he was not advocating a more demanding Elizondo standard but would avoid the label.

Judge Finley would instead grant relief under Article 11.073. Relying on Ex parte Robbins, he reasoned that Dr. Peacock’s re-evaluation is new scientific evidence that survives the writ bar and warrants relief, because “the scientific evidence that the State relied upon at Applicant’s trial—the medical examiner’s conclusion that the death was a homicide—has now been contradicted by new relevant scientific evidence that was unavailable at the time of trial,” and that by a preponderance of the evidence Mejia would not have been convicted had it been presented.

Status

The court set aside the judgments and remanded Mejia to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis County to answer the charges in the indictment, with any necessary bench warrant to issue within ten days of the mandate. It says nothing about whether the State intends to retry the case. The decision was reported by the Austin American-Statesman on January 23, 2026.